Fredriksson, A. 2019 (with Gustavo Magalhães de Oliveira). Impact evaluation using Difference-in-Differences. RAUSP Management Journal, special issue on Research Methods in Management. (link)

The paper aims to present the Difference-in-Differences (DiD) method in an accessible language to a broad research audience from a variety of management-related fields. We cover the main issues involved when conducting DiD studies, including the fundamentals as well as some recent developments.

Fredriksson, A., 2017. Location-Allocation of Public Services – Citizen Access, Transparency and Measurement. A method and evidence from Brazil and Sweden. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 59, 1-12. (link, link to Working Paper)

Fredriksson, A., 2014. Bureaucracy intermediaries, corruption and red tape. Journal of Development Economics, 108, 256-273. (link, downloads)

Becker, T., Fredriksson, A., 2012. The European Transition Economies. In Mordechai E. Kreinin and Michael G. Plummer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Commercial Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (paper, book, review)

Fredriksson, A., 2009. Bureaucracy, Informality and Taxation: Essays in Development Economics and Public Finance. IIES Monograph Series No. 65, Institute for International Economic Studies. (link)


Fredriksson, A., 2019. One Stop Shops for Public Services – Evidence from Citizen Service Centers in Brazil. (link)

Paper abstract: One Stop Shops for public services, or Citizen Service Centers, have been implemented in at least 70 countries. We evaluate the impact of such centers on a range of citizen related-variables: the time it takes to undertake a typical licensing errand, the physical displacements involved, how information is obtained, and other variables representing transaction costs, red tape and transparency in the citizen-state interaction. The questions are addressed through a novel data collection on one of the most common errands at the Brazilian bureaucracy, driver´s license renewal. We also evaluate if the quality of the socially relevant components of the licensing procedure is affected. Using a Difference-in-Differences methodology, the study evaluates a program that has inspired One Stop Shop reforms in several countries, developed- and developing. We find large reductions in the time expended by citizens and in proxies for transaction costs, suggesting the reform is a good idea, but less encouraging results for the socially relevant variables. We discuss the extent to which incentives to speed up may have prevailed where other steering instruments would be more appropriate, and potential remedies. Based on our data on actual citizen-state interactions, we also discuss limitations to establishing a true One Stop Shop.


Fredriksson, A., 2019 (with Sylvia Saes). Analyzing the spatial distribution of public services: Political effects, misallocation and welfare. A method and evidence from Citizen Service Centers in Brazil. (link)

Paper abstract: Many countries have implemented Citizen Service Centers in order to improve access to the government bureaucracy. These One Stop Shops offer a range of public services in the same physical location, which promises to make service delivery more efficient. As with other public services, the spatial allocation of the One Stop Shops is typically driven by citizen demand, but political and related factors often also play a role. In this paper, we develop a method to assess the extent to which the spatial allocation of citizen-accessed public services meets citizen demand and the extent to which political and other factors also play a role. By combining location-allocation modelling and regression analysis, we suggest a method for how the welfare effects on citizens from politically motivated spatial misallocation can be quantified. We illustrate by analyzing Citizen Service Centers in the state of São Paulo, Brazil, a reform for which we find modest yet non-neglible political effects on the spatial allocation.


Fredriksson, A., 2018. Optimal penalties on informal firms. (link)

Paper abstract: What, if anything, should be done about the informal economy in developing countries? I study optimal penalties vis-à-vis informal firms in a simple capital accumulation model under three different government objectives: maximize formalization, maximize tax revenue from formalizing informal firms, and maximize welfare. A general conclusion, for all objectives, is that low productivity informal firms should be left alone. Higher productivity informal firms should instead face positive penalties. As the three objectives lead to differences in the range and severity of penalties towards such firms, however, the study also highlights the importance of discussing the appropriate policy objective vis-à-vis informality.


Fredriksson, A., 2016. Servicekontorens rumsliga fördelning: Kan operationsanalys bidra till en effektiv lokalisering av offentliga tjänster? Ekonomisk Debatt 44(3): 49-61. [A study of Swedish Citizen Service Centers, published in the Journal of the Swedish Economic Association.] (link)


Fredriksson, A., 2016. Poupatempo – Uma Avaliação de Impacto com o Olhar no cidadão. Boletím FIPE 427: 34-37.[A summary of some of the results of the data collection project on Citizen Service Centers in São Paulo.] (link)


Location of public services – theory and application to cancer treatment in Brazil


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